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NOTE 
NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE 
COUNCIL V. ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION AGENCY: 
A CALL FOR 
EVENHANDED APPLICATION OF 
THE CLEAN WATER ACT OF 1972 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a stream running between two open fields. On one field, 
the local municipality is constructing a neighborhood park. On the other, 
a private energy company is constructing an oil well field to extract oil 
from the ground. In both cases, bulldozers and earthmovers are moving 
dirt around the site. I Now imagine that muddy water is running off of 
both sites and into the stream. The sediment contained within the muddy 
water starts to settle out and fill in the stream.2 This eventually reduces 
1 See Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and Development 
Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,564 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pt. 450) ("Construction activity typically involves site selection and planning, and land· 
disturbing tasks such as clearing, excavating and grading."). 
2 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations for Revision of the 
Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,728 
(Dec. 8, 1999) {codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122·124 (Westlaw 2009». This document provides 
support for the EPA's Phase II regulation of storm water discharges through the NPDES Program. 
With regard to impacts to streams associated with construction site runoff, the EPA notes that 
"[iJntroduction of coarse sediment (coarse sand or larger) or a large amount of fine sediment is also a 
concern because of the potential of filling lakes and reservoirs (along with the associated 
remediation costs for dredging), as well as clogging stream channels." Id. 
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the habitat for aquatic species and could result in fish dying? Even 
though both sites are allowing muddy water to enter the stream, only the 
local municipality constructing the neighborhood park would be in 
violation of the Clean Water Act of 1972 ("CW A"). The municipality 
would be required to obtain a permit with the Environmental Protection 
Agency ("EPA") that would regulate any pollutant, including sediment, 
coming off its construction site. Even though the private energy 
company is polluting the stream in the same manner, the company would 
be exempt from the CW A permitting requirements. 
In 2006, the EPA created a permit exemption for oil and gas 
construction sites if the only thing coming off the site was sediment.4 As 
a result, the hypothetical private energy company would have been 
allowed to pollute the stream with the sediment from its construction site. 
It is unfair that one construction site can get away with polluting a stream 
while another construction site, with similar discharges, has to comply 
with the CW A requirements. The EPA has a duty to apply its regulations 
under the CWA evenhandedly.5 If the EPA treats like cases differently 
without support for the distinction, then the EPA would fail to meet one 
of its obligations under the CW A-to prohibit unlawful discharges 
without a permit-and would not be performing its duties under the 
CWA. 
In Natural Resources Defense Council v. EPA ("NRDC v. EPA"), 
the Natural Resources Defense Council ("NRDC") challenged the EPA's 
permit exemption for oil and gas construction sites as a violation of the 
CWA, claiming that the exemption was inconsistent with the CWA's 
goal of protecting the nation's waters.6 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the EPA's rule was arbitrary and 
capricious in light of the EPA's consistent, long-standing position of 
3 See id. at 68,728-29 ("Large inputs of coarse sediment into stream channels initially will 
reduce stream depth and minimize habitat complexity by filling in pools"). 
4 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008),526 F.3d 591, 600 (9th Cir. 2008). The 
EPA created a permit exemption for oil and gas consttuction sites after the passage of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, in which Congress amended the definition of oil and gas exploration and 
production to include consttuction sites. The EPA believed that Congress amended the definition in 
order to extend existing exemptions for oil and gas operations to oil and gas consttuction sites. Id. 
S See Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 517 F.2d 761, 765 (1st Cir. 1975) 
("[An administrative agency) has a duty to define and apply its policies in a minimally responsible 
and evenhanded way."). 
6 NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 601 ("NRDC and the other petitioners contend that [the) EPA's 
final rule and regulation, which exempts from NPDES permitting the runoff of sediment-laden storm 
water from oil and gas consttuction activities, contravenes Congressional intent and constitutes an 
impermissible interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CW A, as amended by the Energy Policy Act 
of 2005."). 
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requiring permits for sediment discharges.7 In addition, the Ninth Circuit 
supported its reasoning with the fact that Congress did not specifically 
mention the term "sediment" in the relevant statute or discuss what 
should or should not be exempt from permitting.8 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit correctly held that the 
permit exemption was arbitrary and capricious not only because the EPA 
changed its long-standing position on what it considered a contaminant, 
but also because the permit exemption was manifestly contrary to the 
CW A, as it allowed discharges of a known pollutant to go unregulated 
from oil and gas construction sites. The permit exemption also lacked a 
permitting scheme to ensure oil and gas construction sites were indeed 
exempt. However, the court failed to address the EPA's attempt to carve 
out an exemption for one segment of the construction industry, oil and 
gas, and not for the rest of the construction industry. By not addressing 
this issue, the court has left the door open for the EPA to create 
exemptions that give preference to certain segments of the industry, but 
not to others in similar situations. 
Part I of this Note provides a brief overview of the CWA; a 
description of how sediment is regulated under the CW A; an explanation 
of the existing exemption for oil and gas operations; and a summary of 
the Chevron deference test, which the Ninth Circuit used to analyze the 
EPA's statutory interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CW A. Part II 
summarizes the facts, procedural history, and majority and dissenting 
opinions in NRDC v. EPA. Part III explains that the Ninth Circuit 
correctly held that the EPA's permit exemption was arbitrary and 
capricious. Part IV argues that the Ninth Circuit failed to address the 
EPA's impermissible attempt to carve out an exemption for oil and gas 
construction sites and not to other construction sites without support for 
treating these like cases differently. By not addressing this issue, the 
court left the door open for the EPA to attempt to create similar 
exemptions without consideration of whether it gives preferential 
treatment to one group and not to another group in a similar situation. 
7 [d. at 607-08 ("[W]e conclude that [the] EPA's inconsistent and conflicting position 
regarding the discharge of sediment-laden storm water from oil and gas construction sites causes its 
interpretation of amended section 402(1)(2) ... to be arbitrary and capricious."); see also id. at 602 
(stating that the EPA's permit exemption would be reviewed under the Administrative Policy Act, 
codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06, which states that the court shall "set aside agency action ... found to 
be ... arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance to law."). 
"Arbitrary" is defined as "founded on prejudice or preference rather than on reason or fact. This 
type of decision is often termed arbitrary and capricious." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 
2004). 
8 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 608. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
NRDC v. EPA involved a challenge to the EPA's pennit exemption 
for oil and gas construction activities with sediment-only discharges.9 To 
gain a general understanding of the issue, the following section will 
provide a brief overview of the following: the purpose of the CW A; the 
impacts of construction site sediment on the nation's waters; the 
application of section 402 of the CW A to oil and gas sites; and the 
Chevron deference test, under which the Ninth Circuit reviewed the 
EPA's pennit exemption for oil and gas construction sites. 
A. PURPOSE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT 
Congress enacted the CW A in 1972 with the stated objective "to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of 
the nation's waters.,,10 The CW A makes "discharge of pollutants" 
unlawful except when discharges are in compliance with specified 
sections of the CW A. 11 Congress expressly gave the EPA authority to 
administer the CW A.12 Thus, Congress gave the EPA the authority to 
use its best professional judgment and expertise to implement the CW A 
in accordance with congressional goals for the CW A. 13 
In carrying out the CW A, the EPA must minimize the amount of 
pollutants that enter the nation's waters. 14 One way the EPA does this is 
by requiring potential polluters to obtain pennits that would allow 
9 Id. at 594. NRDC contended that the permit exemption was unlawful under the CW A and 
asked the Ninth Circuit to vacate the rule. [d. 
10 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2008); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for 
the Construction and Development Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,564 (proposed 
Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450). 
Ii 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(12) (Westlaw 2008) ("discharge ofa pollutant" means any addition of 
any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source); 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(6) (Westlaw 2008) 
("pollutant" means dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, 
munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded 
equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste discharged into 
water); 33 U.S.C.A, § 1311(a) (Westlaw 2008) (referencing specific sections of the CWA that would 
permit pollutant discharges so long as discharges were in compliance with the conditions set forth in 
the specified sections; any discharges not in compliance with these sections are unlawful). 
12 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(d) (Westlaw 2008) ("Except as otherwise expressly provided in this 
chapter, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency... shall administer this 
chapter."). 
13 See NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 595 n.4 (quoting a conference report stating that the 
"determination of whether storm water is contaminated is within the Administrator's discretion"). 
14 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a), (d) (Westlaw 2008) (designating the EPA as the Administrator 
of the CW A). The EPA, therefore, must administer the CW A consistent with the objectives of the 
CWA. 
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discharge of pollutants with certain limitations. 15 Section 402 of the 
CW A describes the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
("NPDES") Program. 16 The EPA controls discharge of pollutants from 
"point sources" into bodies of water through this program. 17 The EPA 
requires dischargers to obtain NPDES permits, also referred to as storm 
water discharge permits, in order to regulate pollutant discharges. 18 
1. Construction Site Sediment 
"Sediment is, by weight, the greatest pollutant of water resources.,,19 
The EPA had expressed concern that construction activities, although 
temporary in nature, were a major source of water quality issues that 
required oversight and enforcement.2o The EPA asserted that 
construction sites "contribute more sediment to streams than previously 
deposited [naturally] over several decades. ,,21 When developing 
regulations to control construction site discharges, the EPA referred to 
several studies that documented the magnitude of sediment deposition 
15 40 C.F.R. § 122.I(b)(I) (Westlaw 2009) ("The NPDES program requires permits for the 
discharge of 'pollutants' from any 'point source' into 'waters of the Vnited States."'). 
16 See generally 33 V.S.C.A. § 1342(a)-(q) (Westlaw 2008) (outlining, among other things, 
who can issue permits that allow discharge of pollutants, who can administer the NPDES program, 
limitations on permit requirements, and how certain activities would be permitted). 
17 33 V.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (Westlaw 2008) (defining "point source" to mean any discernible, 
confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, 
conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or 
vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged). 
18 40 C.F.R. § 122.I(b)(1) (Westlaw 2009) (requiring storm water permits for pollutant 
discharges into "waters of the Vnited States"). 
19 G. ALLAN BURTON, JR., & ROBERT E. PITT, STORMWATER EFFECTS HANDBOOK - A 
TOOLBOX FOR WATERSHED MANAGERS, SCIENTISTS, AND ENGINEERS 32 (2002), available at 
http://www .epa.gov / ednnrrnrl/pub licationslbookslhandbooklhirezhandbook. pdf. 
20 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for 
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 48,033 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 
I 22.26(c)(1)(iii) (2006)). 
21 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1306 (9th Cir. 1992); see 
also National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations for Revision of the Water 
Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,728-29 
(Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-124 (Westlaw 2009)) (referencing several reports and 
studies supporting the EPA's statements that streams were affected by construction activity that led 
to stream impairment); Effluent Limitations Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and 
Development Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,564 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pI. 450) ("Construction activity typically involves site selection and planning, 
and land-disturbing tasks such as clearing, excavating and grading. Disturbed soil, if not managed 
properly, can be easily washed off-site during storm events. Although streams and rivers naturally 
carry sediment loads, discharges from construction activity can elevate these loads to levels above 
those in undisturbed watersheds."). 
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into streams.22 One study documented that construction sites contributed 
nineteen times the sediment contributed by agricultural areas.23 
Sediment discharges have been shown to extend far downstream from 
the actual construction sites.24 Because the impacts of sediment include 
stream degradation, loss of fish habitat, increased flooding, and negative 
impacts to recreation,25 the EPA requires a permit for a construction site 
if the activity involves disturbance of one acre of land or more.26 The 
NPDES permit requires that sediment controls be in place to minimize 
sediment from running off the construction site and into a waterway. 27 
22 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Regulations (NPDES) for Revision 
of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 
68,729 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 122-124 (Westlaw 2009» ("A highway 
construction project in West Virginia disturbed only 4.2 percent of a 4.72-square-mile basin, but 
resulted in a three-fold increase in suspended sediment yields .... During the largest storm event, it 
was estimated that 80 percent of the sediment in the stream originated from the construction site .... 
A 1970 study determined that sediment yields from construction areas can be as much as 500 times 
the levels detected in rural areas."). 
23 [d. (citing a m;:>nitoring study of sediment loads from three residential construction sites as 
compared to an agricultural area). 
24 [d. (referencing a study that documents the impact of construction site sediment 
approximately 5.6 kilometers downstream from the construction site). 
25 See David L. Hatchett, Regulation of Construction Site Stormwater Runoff: We Can Do 
Beller Than This, 29 IND. L. REv. 153,155 (1995) ("The direct economic impacts of sedimentation 
include water storage loss, flooding, dredging costs, water treatment and use, and damage to 
fisheries. Water-based recreation also suffers damage from sedimentation ... due to destruction of 
fish habitat, siltation of recreation activities, and eutrophication of water ways."); see also NPDES 
Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing Storm Water 
Discharges, 64 Fed. Reg. at 68,728-29 ("Large inputs of coarse sediment into stream channels 
initially will reduce stream depth and minimize habitat complexity by filling in pools."). 
26 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(15)(i) (2006). See Effiuent Limitations Guidelines and Standards 
for the Construction and Development Point Source Category 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,571 
(proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 450) ("Typically, construction activities 
involve clearing the land of vegetation, digging, earth moving and grading, followed by the active 
construction period when the affected land is usually left denuded and the soil compacted, often 
leading to an increase in the peak discharge rate and the total volume of storm water discharged and 
higher rates to erosion .... Where the soil surface is unprotected, soil and sand particles may be 
easily picked up by wind and/or washed away by rain or snow melt."); see also National Pollutant 
Discharge Elimination System Permit (NPDES) Application Regulations for Storm Water 
Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,992 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(l)(iii) 
(2006» ("Even a small amount of construction may have a significant negative impact on water 
quality in localized areas."). 
27 See Effiuent Limitations Guidelines and Standards, 73 Fed. Reg. at 72,565. The EPA 
requires that a discharger develop and implement a storm water pollution prevention plan that 
describes what control measures the discharger will be implementing to minimize discharges from 
the construction sites. In addition, the EPA requires dischargers to monitor, inspect and report 
releases of hazardous substances. [d. 
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2. Oil and Gas Exploration and Production 
Congress recognized that oil and gas operators expended resources 
toward implementing best management practices on their sites to 
minimize pollutant discharges?8 Therefore, Congress did not want to 
burden oil and gas operators with a permit requirement.29 Congress also 
saw a potential drain on the EPA's staff resources if the EPA were 
required to permit all oil and gas operators.30 In consideration of these 
two factors, Congress allowed the EPA to create a NPDES permit 
exemption for uncontaminated storm water runoff from oil and gas 
operations.3! 
The EPA outlined when a discharge from an oil or gas operation 
would be considered a "contaminant" that triggered the NPDES permit 
requirement. 32 The exemption stated that the Administrator would not 
require a permit for storm water discharges from oil and gas exploration 
and production sites that "are not contaminated by contact with any 
overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product, 
byproduct or waste products located on the site of such operations.,,33 
28 NPDES Pennit Application Regulations for Stonn Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. at 
48,029 ("Congress also recognized that there are numerous situations in the mining and oil and gas 
industries where stonn water is channeled around plants and operations through a series of ditches 
and other structural devices in order to prevent pollution of the stonn water by hannful 
contaminants. From the standpoint of resource drain on both EPA as the permitting agency and 
potential pennit applicants, the conclusion was that operators that use good management practices 
and make expenditures to prevent contamination must not be burdened with the requirement to 
obtain a permit."); see also id. at 48,034 ("Techniques to prevent or control pollutants in storm water 
discharges from construction are well developed and understood. A primary control technique is 
good site planning. A combination of nonstructural and structural best management practices are 
typically used on construction sites. Relatively inexpensive non-structural vegetative controls, such 
as seeding and mulching, are effective control techniques. In some cases, more expensive structural 
controls may be necessary, such as detention basins or diversions."). 
29 [d. at 48029 ("From the standpoint of resource drain on both EPA as the pennitting agency 
and potential permit applicants, the conclusion was that operators that use good management 
practices and make expenditures to prevent contamination must not be burdened with the 
requirement to obtain a permit."). 
30 [d. 
31 [d. ("[S]ection 402(1)(2) creates a statutory exemption from storm water permitting 
requirements for uncontaminated runoff from these facilities .... Storm water discharges that are not 
contaminated by contact with any overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product, 
byproduct or waste products located on the site of such operations will not be required to obtain a 
storm water discharge permit."). 
32 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(I)(iv) (2006) ("The operator of an existing or new discharge 
composed entirely of stonn water from a mining operation is not required to submit a pennit 
application unless the discharge has come into contact with, any overburden, raw material, 
intermediate products, finished product, byproduct or waste products located on the site of such 
operations."). 
33 33 V.S.C.A. § 1342(1)(2) (Westlaw 2009). 
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The EPA required an NPDES pennit when an oil and gas operation 
either released a reportable quantity of oil or hazardous substances in 
storm water or if the discharge "contribute[d] to a violation of a water 
quality standard. ,,34 
The exemption was limited to oil and gas operation activities, while 
oil and gas construction sites were required to obtain an NPDES 
permit. 35 However, the EPA discovered that this permit requirement 
would impact up to 30,000 oil and gas construction sites, which was 
more than the EPA intended to cover.36 The EPA found that the permit 
requirement would have a significant economic impact on these sites and 
wanted to evaluate the magnitude of impact.37 Consequently, the EPA 
did not require oil and gas construction sites disturbing one or more acres 
to obtain a permit until it completed its impact study.38 
B. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE CHEVRON 
DEFERENCE TEST 
The Administrative Procedure Act ("AP A") established the 
framework for judicial review of agency actions.39 The APA states, in 
34 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c}(I}(iii} (2006) ("The operator of an existing or new discharge 
composed entirely of storm water from an oil or gas exploration, production, processing, or 
treatment operation, or transmission facility is not required to submit a permit application in 
accordance with paragraph (c}(I}(i) of this section, unless the facility: (A) Has had a discharge of 
storm water resulting in the discharge of a reportable quantity for which notification is or was 
required pursuant to 40 CFR 117.21 or 40 CFR 302.6 at anytime since November 16, 1987; or (8) 
Has had a discharge of storm water resulting in the discharge of a reportable quantity for which 
notification is or was required pursuant to 40 CFR 110.6 at any time since November 16, 1987; or 
(C) Contributes to a violation of a water quality standard."). 
3S Natural Res. Oef. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 597 (9th Cir. 2008); see 33 
V.S.C.A. § 1362(24} (Westlaw 2008) ("The term 'oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or 
treatment operations or transmission facilities' means all field activities or operations associated with 
exploration, production, processing, or treatment operations, or transmission facilities, including 
activities necessary to prepare a site for drilling and for the movement and placement of drilling 
equipment, whether or not such field activities or operations may be considered to be construction 
activities."); see also V.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, INDUSTRIAL STORMWATER 
FACT SHEET SERIES, SECTOR I: OIL AND GAS EXTRACTION FACILITIES (2006), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdes/pubslsector_i_oilgas.pdf (Construction activities at an oil and gas facility 
include installing access roads, drill pads, mud/reserve pits, personnel quarters, surface 
impoundments, storage tanks, and pipelines.). 
36 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 598 n.IO (noting the EPA's initial assumption that only a few oil 
and gas construction sites would be affected by the permit requirement on the presumption that most 
of these sites disturbed less than one acre). 
37 [d. at 598. 
38 [d. (The EPA deferred the application of the permit requirement to oil and gas construction 
sites for a total of three years and three months in order to collect information about oil and gas 
construction sites and analyze the economic impact the permit requirement had on these activities.). 
39 5 V.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw 2009). 
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part, that 
[t]he reviewing court shall- hold unlawful and set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions found to be- (A) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law; (B) contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or 
immunity; (C) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or 
limitations, or short of statutory right; [or] (0) without observance of 
procedure required by law .... '10 
To detenmne if an agency's action is arbitrary, capricious, or an 
abuse of discretion, the United States Supreme Court established what is 
referred to as the Chevron deference test in 1984 when it decided 
Chevron US.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council. 41 In step 
one, a court must look at the plain language of the statute and the 
legislative history to see if Congress unambiguously expressed its clear 
intent as to how the statute is to be interpreted by the administrating 
agency.42 If the court finds that Congress has not clearly addressed the 
specific issue in question within the statute, it analyzes the agency's 
interpretation under step two. 43 
In Chevron step two, the court looks at whether the administrating 
agency's interpretation was a permissible one under the statute.44 The 
court cannot substitute its own interpretation of the statute. 4S Rather, the 
court must determine whether the agency's statutory interpretation was 
reasonable, within its authority provided by Congress, and not contrary 
40 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A)-(D) (Westlaw 2009). 
41 Kristen E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search o/the Modern Skidmore Standard, 
107 COLUM. L. REv. 1235, 1236-37 (2007). This article describes the first deference test the U.S. 
Supreme Court established in 1944 in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Skidmore 
test provided that deference to an administrator would "depend upon the thoroughness evident in its 
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, 
and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." 323 U.S. at 140. 
The Court further stated that each statutory interpretation case must stand on its own facts, thereby 
allowing the court to be in a position to interpret the statute for the case at bar as opposed to 
deferring to the administrator's interpretation. Id. 
42 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) ("First, 
always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter."). 
43 Id. at 843 ("[I)f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute."). 
44 Id. 
45 Id. ("[T)he court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be 
necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation."). 
9
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to congressional goals for the statute.46 If the court finds that an 
agency's statutory interpretation satisfies either step of the Chevron 
deference test, the court will defer to the agency's interpretation.47 
The Supreme Court recognized that there were times when 
Congress purposely writes an ambiguous statute.48 The Court 
understood that Congress intended for the administrating agency, which 
Congress designated as the administrator of the statute, to fill the gap 
between the ambiguous statute and the congressional goals of the 
statute.49 Simply put, the agency's interpretation is given controlling 
weight unless found to be arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to 
the congressional intent of the statute. 50 
The Supreme Court asserted that an agency interpretation of a 
relevant provision that conflicts with the agency's earlier interpretation is 
entitled to considerably less deference than a consistently held agency 
view.51 Yet the Supreme Court recognized that "the mere fact that an 
agency interpretation contradicts a prior position is not fatal.,,52 The 
agency must justify its change in position with reasoned analysis.53 A 
court cannot reasonably find that an agency has acted within its 
delegated powers if that agency's assertions lack support. 54 Additionally, 
failing to provide an implementable permitting scheme to verify 
compliance provides support for an argument that an agency's action is 
46 1d. at 845 ("If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies 
that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it unless it appears 
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation [was] not one that Congress would 
have sanctioned.") (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382 (1961)). 
47 See id. at 843-44 (presenting the two step deference test). 
48 1d. at 843-44 ("If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the agency to fill, there is an 
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by 
regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, 
capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute. Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency 
on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its 
own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator 
of an agency."). 
49 1d. 
50 Id. at 844. 
51 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 605 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 447 (1987)). 
52 Id. at 608 (Callahan, J., dissenting)(quoting Smiley v. Citibank 517 U.S. 735, 742 (1996)). 
53 Id. at 609 (Callahan, 1., dissenting) ("Courts will accord Chevron deference to an agency's 
revised interpretation ofa statute if the agency justifies that revision with 'reasoned analysis."'). 
54 See. e.g.. Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th CiT. 
1992) (stating, in the context of review of the EPA's permit exemption for light industries, which 
was not extended to the entire industry class, that "[ w ]ithout supportable facts, we are unable to rely 
on our usual assumption that the EPA has rationally exercised the duties delegated to it by 
Congress"). 
10
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arbitrary and capricious. 55 
Although Congress gives an administrating agency discretion to use 
its expertise in interpreting and implementing a statute, this is not a 
license for the agency to treat similar cases differently.56 The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia explained that 
[a]n agency cannot meet the arbitrary and capricious test by treating 
type A cases differently from similarly situated type B cases. . .. The 
treatment of cases A and B, where the two cases are functionally 
indistinguishable, must be consistent. That is the very meaning of the 
arbitrary and capricious standard. 57 
Therefore, when an agency fails to evenhandedly apply a 
requirement in two cases that are "functionally indistinguishable," the 
agency's actions are deemed arbitrary and capricious.58 
II. NATURAL RESOURCES DEFENSE COUNCIL v. 
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
In NRDC v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit considered whether the EPA's 
permit exemption for oil and gas construction sites that had sediment-
only discharges was in violation the CWA.59 The court held that the 
EPA's creation of the permit exemptions was arbitrary and capricious 
because the exemptions were a "complete departure" from the EPA's 
long-standing position that oil and gas construction site sediment was a 
55 See id. The court stated that the EPA's proposed exemption should have required a light 
industry self-report in order to demonstrate that its facility did not have "actual exposure" to storm 
water and would not require a permit to discharge. Alternatively, the EPA would have to physically 
go to light industrial sites to verify that these sites were indeed exempt from the permit requirements. 
However, the Ninth Circuit found that the proposed regulation failed to contemplate the likelihood 
that either the light industry would self-report or that the EPA would physically verify compliance. 
This further supported the Ninth Circuit's decision that the EPA's proposed exemption for light 
industry was arbitrary and capricious. Id. 
56 See United States v. Diapulse Corp. of Am., 748 F.2d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 1984) (rejecting the 
Food and Drug Administration's refusal to allow the marketing of Diapulse's medical device while 
allowing the marketing of another company's device that was roughly identical to Diapulse's device, 
and insisting that the Food and Drug Administration apply the same legal standards to Diapulse 
afforded to Diapulse's competitors); see also Distrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, F.2d 
761,765-66 (1st Cir. 1975) ("While the Agency has broad powers to regulate, and in so doing to 
choose between rulernaking and individual decisional processes, it also has a duty to define and 
apply its polices in a minimally responsible and evenhanded way."). 
57lndep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
58 [d. 
59 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 594 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(NRDC challenged the permit exemption as an unlawful interpretation of the amended section 
402(1)(2) of the CWA.). 
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contaminant that must be regulated.60 
A. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The EPA was in the midst of assessing the economic impact of the 
NPDES permit requirement on oil and gas construction activities when 
Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act in 2005.61 The Energy Policy 
Act represents a comprehensive national energy policy that addresses 
every form of energy.62 The goal of the Act was to "encourage energy 
efficiency and conservation, promote alternative and renewable energy 
sources, reduce our dependence on foreign sources of energy, and 
increase domestic production.,,63 With regard to oil and gas activities, 
Congress sought to reduce impediments to domestic oil and gas 
exploration and production.64 As a result, Congress amended the 
definition of oil and gas exploration and production in section 402(1)(2) 
of the CWA to include construction activities.65 Congress revised the 
definition as follows: 
The tenn "oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or 
treatment operations or transmission facilities" means all field 
activities or operations associated with exploration, production, 
60 Id. at 607. 
61 Id. at 598 (The EPA postponed the application of the NPDES pennit requirements to oil 
and gas construction sites until June 12, 2006-three years and three months after the effective date 
of the pennit requirement-in order to assess the economic impact the pennit requirement would 
have on these sites); see Energy Policy Act of2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (2005). 
62 Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY L.J. 349, 349 (2006) (providing a 
brief summary of each Title contained in the Energy Policy Act). 
63 U.S. Department of the Interior,lmplementing the Energy Policy Act at the Department of 
the Interior, http://www.doi.gov/iepai (last visited Dec. 9, 2008) (stating that the Department of the 
Interior will playa major role in meeting the goals and objectives of the Energy Policy Act because 
eighty-six sections of the Energy Policy Act require the Department of the Interior to take action). 
64 See Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY LJ. 349, 353 (2006) 
("Similarly, Section 323 of EPAct of 2005 changes the definition of oil and gas exploration and 
production in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also removing an impediment to exploration 
and production of natural gas. EPAct 2005 also creates a royalty-in-kind program, which would 
pennit the Department of the Interior to receive royalties for production of natural gas on federal 
lands in kind rather than in cash. This important provision should make major strides in reducing the 
disputes between natural gas producers and the federal government with regard to the valuation of 
natural gas produced on federal lands. Over time this program, once implemented, should reduce the 
recurrent litigation between producers and the government."); see also Modification of National 
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Pennit Deadline for Stonn Water Discharges for 
Oil and Gas Construction Activity That Disturbs One to Five Acres of Land, 67 Fed. Reg. 79,828, 
79,829 (Dec. 30, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 122 (Westlaw 2009» (detennining that 
approximately 30,000 oil and gas construction sites were required to obtain NPDES pennits and that 
the compliance cost would range from $1,206 to $8,709). 
65 33 U.S.C § 1362(24) (Westlaw 2008); NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 599. 
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processing, or treatment operations, or transmission facilities, 
including activities necessary to prepare a site for drilling and for the 
movement and placement of drilling equipment, whether or not such 
field activities or operations may be considered to be construction 
activities.66 
The EPA codified stonn water pennit exemptions for oil and gas 
operations based upon the original definition in section 402(1)(2) of the 
CWA, which did not include construction activities.67 Although the 
stonn water pennit exemption language remained unchanged by the 
Energy Policy Act, the EPA reevaluated this exemption in light of the 
amended definition of oil and gas exploration and production.68 
In June 2006, the EPA published the pennit exemption amending 
the NPDES pennit requirements for oil and gas construction sites.69 The 
pennit exemption provided that oil and gas construction activities were 
eligible for NPDES pennit exemptions if those activities resulted in 
sediment-only discharges, even if there was a water quality violation.70 
The EPA reasoned that sediment alone was not necessarily indicative of 
"contamination through contact with raw material, intennediate products, 
finished product, byproduct or waste products.,,7l The EPA further 
stated that if sediment came in contact with any of these named 
materials, with a result of either reportable quantities requiring 
notification or a water quality standard violation for a pollutant other 
than sediment, the EPA would require an NPDES pennit.72 
66 33 V.S.C § 1362(24) (Westlaw 2008) (emphasis added). 
67 40 C.F.R. § I 22.26(c)(1)(iii) (2006) (providing NPDES permit requirement triggers for oil 
and gas exploration facilities). 
68 NRDC 2008,526 FJd at 599 ("In January 2006, [the) EPA gave notice of proposed rule-
making that would modify [the) EPA's NPDES storm water permit regulations to reflect the Energy 
Policy Act's change to the definition of oil and gas operations and facilities and the related impact 
on section 402(1)(2)."). 
69 [d. at 600 ("In June 2006, EPA promulgated the challenged final rule-entitled 
'Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Regulations for 
Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, Production, Processing, or 
Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities'--<:odifying changes to the CWA resulting from 
the Energy Policy Act of2005."). . 
70 [d. ("[The) EPA cannot require permits for storm water discharges comprised solely of 
sediment from oil and gas construction activities, even if such discharges contribute to a violation of 
a water quality standard."). 
71 [d. (quoting Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
(NPDES) Regulations for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, 
Production, Processing, or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,628, 
33,361 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii». 
72 Amendments to the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
Regulations for Storm Water Discharges Associated With Oil and Gas Exploration, Production,. 
Processing, or Treatment Operations or Transmission Facilities, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,628, 33,634 (June 
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The NRDC, along with the Oil and Gas Accountability Project, 
Amigos Bravos, and Powder River Basin Resource Council, challenged 
the EPA's permit exemption as an impermissible interpretation of section 
402(1)(2).73 The Ninth Circuit granted review under its authority for 
appellate review of the EPA rules governing the underlying procedures.74 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION 
A panel of the Ninth Circuit, in a 2-1 decision, held that the EPA's 
statutory interpretation of section 402(1)(2), as amended by the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, was arbitrary and capricious because of the EPA's 
change in position regarding what constitutes a "contaminant" in relation 
to oil and gas activities. 75 The majority vacated the EPA's rule and 
remanded the matter back to the agency for further proceedings 
consistent with the court's opinion.76 The dissent, however, stated that 
the EPA acted within its authority when it reassessed the permit 
exemption in light of Congress's intent to provide more exemptions for 
oil and gas activities to meet the goals of the Energy Policy Act.77 
1. Majority 
The Ninth Circuit maJonty used the Chevron deference test to 
determine whether to give deference to the EPA's NPDES permit 
exemption for oil and gas construction activities.78 In Chevron step one, 
the court evaluated whether Congress expressly intended to exempt oil 
and gas construction activities from NPDES permitting when such 
activities discharged only sediment.79 
12, 2006) (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(I)(iii) (2006» ("Sediment could, however, serve as a 
vehicle for discharges of other pollutants, such as oil or grease or hazardous substances (e.g., heavy 
metals) and if a [reportable quantity] is exceeded or a water quality standard violated for such other 
pollutants, such contamination would trigger permitting requirements."). 
73 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 601. 
74/d. 
7S ld. at 607-08 (asserting that the permit exemption was inconsistent and in conflict with the 
EPA's long-standing position on sediment-laden storm water). 
76 ld. at 608. 
77 ld. at 611 (Callahan, J., dissenting) ("Not only was EPA's interpretation in flux at the time 
it promulgated the storm water discharge rule, but it was guided by its interpretation of Congress's 
intent in the Energy Policy Act to provide greater exemptions with regard to the discharge of 
sediment from oil and gas construction activities."). 
78 1d. at 602 (stating the Ninth Circuit's standard of review). 
79 1d. at 526 F.3d at 603 ("First, we must determine whether Congress ... unambiguously 
intended to exempt from NPDES permitting requirements for oil and gas construction activities the 
discharge of storm water runoff contaminated solely with sediment."). 
14
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The EPA argued that it was Congress's intent to allow such 
exemptions for oil and gas construction activities.80 In support of its 
contention, the EPA referred to statements made by members of 
Congress who had opposed the amendment to section 402(1)(2) of the 
CWA.81 The EPA specifically relied on Senator Jim Jeffords's 
explanation that storm water discharges typically contained "pollutants 
such as oil and grease, chemicals, nutrients, metals, bacteria, and 
particulates. ,,82 The EPA stated that the senator's description was 
synonymous with sediment. 83 The EPA argued that the opposition's 
statements confirmed Congress's intent to exempt storm water 
discharges from oil and gas related construction activities, regardless of 
sediment's impact on water quality.84 The court was not persuaded by 
this argument and noted that statements made by opponents, like Senator 
Jeffords, were not authoritative. 85 
The court found that the plain language of section 402(1)(2) did not 
expressly state that exempting sediment-only discharges was Congress's 
intent. 86 In addition, the court stated that Congress did not explicitly 
mention the word "sediment" in the amended definition of oil and gas 
exploration and production.87 Furthermore, there was limited legislative 
history on this section, which did not specifically address whether 
"sediment" discharges should be exempt from permit requirements.88 As 
a result, the court found that Congress was silent on the issue of 
exempting sediment-only discharges from oil and gas construction 
80 !d. at 604 (referring to the legislative history of the amendment to section 402(1)(2) of the 
CWA). 
81 [d. (stating that the EPA noted that one of the reasons the opponents of the Energy Policy 
Act voted against it was because it exempted from CW A regulations the storm water discharges 
from oil and gas construction sites). 
82 [d.; see also lSI CONGo REc. S9335-01, S9349 (daily ed. July 29, 2005) (statement of Sen. 
Jeffords). Senator Jeffords of Vermont opposed § 323 of the Energy Policy Act, stating that this 
section "changes how the Environmental Protection Agency is able to regulate oil and gas 
construction activities under the Phase I and Phase" of the Clean Water Act Storm water Program." 
Further, Senator Jeffords stated that exempting oil and gas construction activities from storm water 
permitting would negatively impact water quality and biological resources in our nation's waters. 
Finally, Senator Jeffords recommended that the EPA should continue to require discharge permits to 
oil and gas construction sites consistent with requirements for other types of construction activities. 
83 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 604. 
84 [d. 
8S [d. at 605 ("[S]tatements by opponents are among the least authoritative, as they are meant 
to defeat the bill in question and do not 'represent the considered and collective understanding of 
those Congressmen' who passed the bill into law."). 
86 [d. at 603 (stating that section 402(1)(2) did not specifically mention the term "sediment"). 
87 [d. at 608. 
88 [d. at 604. 
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activities from pennit requirements.89 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit 
concluded that Chevron step one was not satisfied.9o 
The court then proceeded to step two of the Chevron deference test, 
analyzing the EPA's statutory interpretation to determine whether it was 
a pennissible reading of the statute. 91 The EPA argued that because 
sediment was most commonly associated with construction site 
discharges, Congress must have intended to exempt construction-related 
sediment. 92 The EPA argued that if this were not the case, the 
amendment would be meaningless.93 However, the EPA conceded that it 
had not considered exempting sediment-only discharges from NPDES 
permit requirements prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005.94 Moreover, 
the agency admitted that it previously required storm water permits for 
sediment discharges that violated water quality limitations even if the 
sediment was uncontaminated.95 Lastly, the EPA argued that requiring 
pennits for sediment discharges was a "rule of administrative 
convenience" because it had presumed that sediment runoff from oil and 
gas construction sites likely came in contact with pollutants.96 
The court found the EPA's arguments "unpersuasive in light of 
EPA's own statements during its rule-making process prior to the 
passage of the Energy Policy Act.,,97 The court's finding was based upon 
the agency's long-standing position that oil and gas construction sites 
were prime candidates for storm water pennitting because of the serious 
water quality impacts associated with the sediment-laden discharges.98 
In addition, the court used the EPA's past findings that construction 
activities resulted in greater sediment runoff than agriculture and 
89 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 605 ("Because we conclude that Congress was silent on the issue, 
we move to Chevron step two."). 
90 [d. at 605 ("Because we conclude that Congress was silent on the issue, we move to 
Chevron step two."). 
91 [d. 
92 [d. at 605-06 (The EPA reasoned that because Congress broadened the eXlstmg 
exemptions in section 402(1)(2) for construction sites, it "believe[d] that discharges of sediment 
[were] not necessarily indicative of such contact [with raw material, intermediate products, finished 
product, byproduct or waste products]."). 
93 [d. at 606. 
94 [d. ("[The] EPA concedes that, prior to the Energy Policy Act amendment to the CWA, if 
a gas and oil facility discharged storm water runoff contaminated only with sediment resulting in a 
water quality violation, that facility did not meet the conditions for permit exemption under 402(1 
)(2) and thus was required to apply for a permit."). 
95 [d. at 606. 
96 [d. at 607 (indicating that the pollutants of concern at an oil and gas construction site 
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forestlands as additional support for its conclusion.99 The court also 
disagreed with the EPA's statement that this was a rule of mere 
administrative convenience because of the EPA's prior statements about 
sediment. loo Finally, the court found that because of the agency's long-
standing concern over sediment-laden storm water discharges, and 
studies supporting its concerns, the EPA was compelled to regulate 
sediment discharges under the CW A.101 
As a result, the court found that the EPA's statutory interpretation of 
section 402(1)(2) represented a "complete departure" from what the EPA 
considered to be a contaminant from oil and gas construction sites. I02 
Therefore, the court held that the EPA's statutory interpretation of 
section 402(1)(2), as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, was 
arbitrary and capricious. 103 
2. Dissent 
Circuit Judge Consuelo Callahan dissented. Judge Callahan agreed 
that Congress did not expressly state its intent to exempt sediment-only 
discharges from NPDES permitting in either the plain language of 
section 402(1)(2) or its legislative history.l04 The dissent also agreed that 
the validity of the EPA's permit exemption depended on the result of the 
second step of the Chevron deference test. 105 However, the dissent 
asserted that the majority's analysis under step two was incorrect. 106 
The dissent rejected the majority's reasoning that the EPA's permit 
exemption was arbitrary and capricious simply because the EPA had a 
long-standing position that sediment discharges that violated water 
quality standards required an NPDES permit. 107 Judge Callahan stated 
that 
99 [d. ("[S]ediment runoff rates from construction sites are typically IO to 20 times that of 
agricultural lands ... [and] 1 ,000 to 2,000 times that offorest lands."). 
100 [d. ("In light of [the] EPA's prior statements, it can hardly be said that EPA's previous 
stance was merely a 'rule of administrative convenience' or that [the] EPA never considered how 
sediment alone should be treated prior to the Energy Policy Act of 2005."). 
101 [d. at 607. 
102 [d. 
103 [d. 
104 [d. at 608 (Callahan, 1., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority's analysis under step one of 
the Chevron deference test). 
105 [d. (Callahan, 1., dissenting) ("[A]s the majority correctly concludes, this dispute must be 
resolved at step two of the Chevron analysis."). 
106 [d. (Callahan, 1., dissenting) ("I respectfully part course with the majority and accord [the] 
EPA's permissible interpretation appropriate deference."). 
107 [d. at 610 (Callahan, 1., dissenting) (stating reasons the majority's conclusions were 
incorrect). 
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there appears to be no authority that would compel [the] EPA to stay 
its hand until Congress specifically amended the ambiguous 
exemption at section 402(1)(2) to include the word "sediment." 
Second, the mere fact that [the] EPA revisited the exemption after 
passage of the Energy Policy Act does not render the results of its 
I . b' 108 ana YSls ar Itrary. 
The dissent went on to explain that prior to the passage of the 
Energy Policy Act, the EPA had not committed to a rigid position 
regarding sediment discharges related to oil and gas construction sites. 109 
The dissent opined that the EPA acted within its authority when 
revisiting its statutory interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CW A. IIO 
The dissent concluded that the EPA's interpretation was at least as 
plausible as competing ones and the court should have deferred to the 
agency's interpretation of section 402(1)(2) of the CWA as amended by 
the Energy Policy ACt. 111 
III. THE EPA'S INTERPRETATION OF CWA SECTION 402(L)(2) 
WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS BECAUSE IT WAS A 
COMPLETE DEPARTURE FROM THE EPA'S LONG-
STANDING POSITION THAT SEDIMENT DISCHARGES 
MUST BE REGULATED 
The Ninth Circuit panel based its decision on the fact that the permit 
exemption was a complete departure from the EPA's long-standing 
position that sediment was a contaminant that invoked the NPDES 
permit requirement. 1I2 The court's decision was correct because 
sediment is a pollutant under the CW A; therefore, the EPA is compelled 
to regulate sediment discharges through NPDES permits. l13 The permit 
exemption would have allowed sediment discharges from an oil and gas 
construction site to go unregulated, which would have gone against the 
CW A provision that prohibits discharge of pollutants without a permit. 114 
108 [d. (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
\0
9 /d. (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
110 [d. at 610-11 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
III [d. at 611 (Callahan, J., dissenting). 
112 [d. at 607 (majority opinion). 
113 See Effluent Limitation Guidelines and Standards for the Construction and Development 
Point Source Category, 73 Fed. Reg. 72,562, 72,571 (proposed Nov. 28, 2008) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pI. 450) (uThe most prominent and most widespread pollutant discharged from [construction 
and development) sites is sediment."); see also NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 607 (stating that the court 
recognized the EPA's reports and studies supporting the fact that construction site discharges 
contribute a significant amount of pollutants that the EPA was compelled to regulate). 
114 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a) (Westlaw 2008) (U[T)he Administrator may ... issue a permit for 
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A. THE PERMIT EXEMPTION CONTRAVENED THE GOALS OF 
THECWA 
The EPA's pennit exemption must comport with the CWA's 
overarching goal. 115 For instance, in American Mining Congress v. EPA, 
the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA's regulation that required storm 
water discharge permits for inactive mining operations. 116 The plaintiffs 
argued that the language in the statute clearly regulated only discharges 
from industrial activity.1I7 Since inactive mines were no longer active 
industrial sites, the plaintiffs asserted that a discharge pennit was not 
required. I 18 However, the statute stated that permits were required for 
"discharge[s] associated with industrial activity.,,119 The EPA argued 
that discharges from past mining activities were associated with 
industrial activityl20 and noted that some inactive mining sites still 
represented a significant source of contamination that required 
regulating. 121 
The Ninth Circuit found that it was reasonable for the EPA to 
require discharge permits for inactive mining operations. 122 The court 
found the EPA's decision stemmed from the undisputed fact that there 
was ongoing contamination from these sites. 123 The court went on say 
that the EPA further limited the scope of regulation of inactive mines to 
sites where discharges likely became contaminated through association 
discharge of a pollutant."); see 33 U.S.C.A. § l251(a) (Westlaw 2008). 
115 See 33 V.S.C.A. § l251(d) (Westlaw 2008). Congress named the EPA the Administrator 
of the CW A. As such, the EPA is charged with implementing the CW A in accordance with the 
stated congressional goal of the CW A "to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the nation's waters." /d. 
116 Am. Mining Congo V. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 764 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Section 402(p)(2)(8) of 
the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(2)(8), authorizes [the] EPA to require a permit for any storm water 
discharge 'associated with industrial activity.' AMC contends that [the] EPA's regulation of 
discharges from inactive mines under this section contravenes Congress' intent."). 
117/d. 
118/d. (explaining that the plain language of the statute regulated "industrial activity" and that 
since there was no "activity" at an inactive mine, the statute would not apply). 
119 [d. (emphasis added). 
120 [d. (explaining that "past industrial activity ... including mines, may be 'associated with' 
that industrial activity, and referencing 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14), which defines "discharge 
associated with industrial activity" as discharges from "areas where significant industrial activity has 
taken place in the past and significant materials remain and are exposed to storm water"). 
121 /d. at 765. 
122 See id. at 765 ("We conclude that [the] EPA's regulation meets the reasonableness 
standard. "). 
123 See id. (referencing the EPA's statement that mining sites represented a significant source 
of contaminated storm water runoff, which was well documented and was an assertion that AMC did 
not challenge). 
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with industrial activity.124 Finally, the court held that the EPA's 
interpretation was consistent with the overall goals of the CW A because 
Congress intended to give the EPA authority to adopt an orderly 
permitting process to address the major contributors of pollutants. 125 
In NRDC v. EPA, unlike in American Mining Congress, the permit 
exemption for oil and gas construction sites was contrary to the overall 
goals of the CW A. As the Ninth Circuit acknowledged, the EPA had a 
long-standing position that sediment was a pollutant under the CW A and 
was compelled to regulate it. 126 When the EPA promulgated its 
regulations for construction site discharges, it stressed the harm to the 
waterways that results from these types of discharges. 127 The EPA has 
even provided data demonstrating the amount of sediment deposited into 
streams from construction activity as compared to other types of land 
uses. 128 Based on scientific data and studies, the EPA concluded that 
construction site discharges must be regulated through NPDES 
permits. 129 
Even though the EPA knew (and previously admitted) this area 
needed regulation, it likely created a new exemption for oil and gas 
construction sites to meet Congress's goal for the Energy Policy ACt. 130 
One of the goals of this Act was to increase domestic production of 
energy supplies in order to decrease the nation's dependence on foreign 
supplies. 131 A way to meet this goal is to relieve the energy producers 
124 !d. at 765-66. 
125 [d. at 766. 
126 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008),526 F.3d 591, 607 (9th Cir. 2008). 
127 See National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System Permit Application Regulations for 
Storm Water Discharges, 55 Fed. Reg. 47,990, 47,992 (Nov. 16, 1990) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
122-124 (Westlaw 2009» (stating that "[elven a small amount of construction may have a significant 
negative impact on water quality in localized areas"). 
128 See id. With regard to construction site sediment, the EPA has stated that construction sites 
contribute "10 to 20 times that of agricultural lands" and "1,000 to 2,000 times that of forest lands." 
[d. 
129 See id. at 48,033-34 ("EPA is convinced that because of the impacts of construction 
discharges that are directly to waters of the United States, such discharges should be addressed by 
permits issued by Federal or NPDES State permitting authorities. It is evident from numerous 
studies and reports submitted under section 319 of the CW A that discharges from construction sites 
continue to be a major source of water quality problems and water quality standard violations. 
Accordingly EPA is compelled to address these source[ slunder these regulations and thereby 
regulate these sources under a nationally consistent program with an appropriate level of 
enforcement and oversight."). 
130 See Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY L.1. 349, 353 (2006) 
("Similarly, Section 323 of EPAct of 2005 changes the definition of oil and gas exploration and 
production in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, also removing an impediment to exploration 
and production of natural gas."). 
131 Justin Stole, The Energy Policy Act of 2005: The Path to Energy Autonomy, 33 J. LEGIS. 
119, 128 (2006) ("[Tlhe long-awaited Act includes provisions that aim to '[ dlecrease ... America's 
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from certain environmental compliance requirements placed on their 
construction sites. For example, in order to reduce impediments to oil 
and gas production, Congress revised the definition for oil and gas 
exploration and production in the CWA to include construction sites. 132 
Congress did this in order to extend the existing exemptions for oil and 
gas operations to oil and gas construction sites. 133 However, Congress 
did not authorize the EPA to allow pollutants to go unregulated in order 
to meet the goals of the Energy Policy ACt. 134 
By allowing an oil and gas construction site to discharge sediment 
without a permit, the EPA would in effect authorize discharges of a 
known pollutant. The existing permit exemption for oil and gas 
operations did not include exemptions for sediment-only discharges. 135 
Rather, the EPA created a new exemption in order to make it feasible for 
oil and gas construction sites to be exempt from storm water permit 
requirements. 136 Yet the EPA failed to refute its own statements that 
sediment was a contaminant under the CW A and must be regulated. 137 
The EPA also did not offer supporting evidence that sediment, alone, 
dangerous dependence' on Middle Eastern oil, promote new 'nuclear and hydropower production,' 
and supply 'leadership in energy conservation."'). 
132 See Legislation Committee, Committee Report, 27 ENERGY L.J. 349, 353 (2006). 
133 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 603 (9th Cir. 2008) 
("The plain language of section 402(1 )(2) of the CW A, as affected by the Energy Policy Act, does 
not indicate whether or not Congress intended that the NPDES permit exemption cover storm water 
discharges contaminated solely with sediment. Neither CW A section 402(1 )(2) nor section 323 of 
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 mention the term 'sediment.' The statutory language of section 
402(1)(2) merely indicates that oil and gas operations or facilities, which now include construction 
activities, are exempt from NPDES permitting requirements so long as the storm water runoff from 
those activities is not contaminated with, or does not come in contact with, certain statutorily 
undefined contaminants: overburden, raw material, intermediate products, finished product, 
byproduct, or waste products."). 
134 See 33 V.S.C.A. § 1362(24) (Westlaw 2008) Congress amended the definition of oil and 
gas exploration and production to include construction activities. No additional guidance was 
provided by Congress in either the amended section of the CW A or the legislative history of the 
Energy Policy Act; see also NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 608 ("[T]he statutory exemption (402(1)(2)) 
[did not] make any mention at all of 'sediment' -or of whether it was covered or not."). 
I35 See NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 603 (explaining that Congress did not expressly mention the 
word sediment when amending CW A section 402(1)(2) or section 323 of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005, and that the existing exemption for oil and gas exploration and production facilities does not 
mention the word "sediment"). 
136 See id. at 606 ("Thus, EPA argues that, because 'sediment is the pollutant most commonly 
associated with construction activities,' Congress must have meant to exempt all construction-related 
sediment with it made construction activities eligible for the exemption, or else the amendment 
would be effectively meaningless."). 
137 See id. at 607 (explaining that the EPA's numerous reports and studies support the fact that 
construction site discharges impact water quality and concluding that the EPA must regulate these 
discharges). 
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would not impact the nation's waters. 138 Creating exemptions for 
construction site sediment would frustrate the objective of the CW A, 
which includes the express prohibition of the discharge of any pollutant 
without a permit. 139 
B. THE PERMIT EXEMPTION LACKED A PERMITTING SCHEME 
TO ENSURE COMPLIANCE WITH THE CW A 
The exemption was also arbitrary and capricious because the EPA 
did not provide a permitting scheme to ensure an oil and gas construction 
site would have fallen within the storm water permit exemption. 140 
Without an adequate permitting scheme, the EPA cannot ensure that an 
oil and gas company would apply for a permit if its construction site 
sediment came into contact with contaminants typically found at these 
sites. 141 This scenario is similar to the EPA's previously proposed 
exemption from storm water permitting requirements for light industries 
so long as there was no actual exposure to storm water. 142 In 1992, the 
Ninth Circuit found that the EPA lacked an adequate permitting scheme 
to ensure that a light industrial facility was not actually exposed to storm 
water and exempt from permitting.143 The court found the permit 
exemption to be arbitrary and capricious, and noted that the only way 
that the EPA would be assured that a light industry was exempt was if 
the facility self-reported or if the EPA conducted its own inspections of 
138 See id. ("EPA also argues that it never previously considered, until the 2005 amendment, 
how sediment alone should be treated under existing regulations."). 
139 See 33 V.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2008) ("The objective of [the Clean Water Act] is to 
restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."); see 
also 33 V.S.C.A. § 131 1 (a) (Westlaw 2008) ("Except as in compliance with this section and sections 
1312,1316,1317,1328,1342, and 1344 of this title, the discharge of any pollutant by any person 
shall be unlawful."). 
140 Cf Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC /992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992). 
The Ninth Circuit struck down an NPDES permit exemption for light industries. One of the reasons 
included the lack of a permitting scheme that would ensure a light industry was within the permit 
exemption. The court doubted that a light industrial facility would have self-reported to the EPA 
that their facility was exempt. In addition, the court doubted that the EPA would verify whether a 
light industrial facility was indeed exempt. Because there was no assurance that a light industrial 
site would apply for a permit if there were actual exposure to storm water, the Ninth Circuit found 
the permit exemption for light industries arbitrary and capricious. /d. 
141 See generally 33 V.S.C.A. § 1342(/)(2) (Westlaw 2009) (identifying the contaminants 
typically found at an oil and gas site). 
142 NRDC /992, 966 F.2d at 1304-05 (holding that the permit exemption was arbitrary and 
capricious because the EPA created the exemption without substantiated support for its assumptions 
that light industrial facilities (i.e., facilities that are comparable to retail, commercial or service 
industries such as manufacturers of pharmaceuticals, paints, varnishes, fabrics, paper board, jewelry, 
and toys) typically occur indoors and that exposure to storm water would therefore be minimal). 
143 /d. at 1305. 
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these facilities. 144 
Without a well-thought-out permitting scheme to ensure compliance 
with a permit exemption, a potential loophole would be created that 
would allow unlawful discharges to go unregulated. For example, in 
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, environmental groups challenged the 
EPA's regulation of water pollutants from concentrated animal feeding 
operations ("CAFO,,).145 One of the many challenges involved the storm 
water permit exemption for agriculture storm water discharge,146 which 
did not require storm water permits for any "precipitation-related 
discharge of manure, litter, or any process washwater from land areas 
under control of a CAFO" when the CAFO's methods were consistent 
with nutrient management plans. 147 In other words, if a CAFO operator 
properly managed the land application of manure, litter, or process 
washwater, it would not be liable for rainwater that carried these 
constituents off the site. 148 Therefore, the CAFO operator would be 
exempt from permit requirements. 149 
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc., argued that agricultural storm water 
runoff from CAFO sites should be regulated because CAFO discharges 
were a regulated point source under the CW A. 150 The Second Circuit 
rejected this argument because agriculture storm water was explicitly 
excluded from the definition of point source in the CW A. 151 The court 
said that Congress's goal was not to hold a CAFO liable for discharges 
that were caused by nature. 152 As a result, the court held that this 
144 Id. (stating that the regulations did not contemplate how the EPA would ensure compliance 
and finding it unlikely that the two options would be implemented by the EPA). 
145 Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 497 (2d Cir. 2005) (challenging the 
CAFO rule, the pennitting scheme, the types of discharges subject to regulation under the CAFO 
rule, and the effiuent limitation guidelines in the CAFO rule). 
146 1d. at 506. 
147 Id. at 507. 
148 1d. at 509 ("[W]here a CAFO has taken steps to ensure appropriate agricultural utilization 
of the nutrients in manure, litter, and process wastewater, it should not be held accountable for any 
discharged that is primarily the result of 'precipitation. "'). 
149 See id. at 507 ("[T]he Rule, like the Clean Water Act itself, carves out an exception where 
the discharge in question is 'an agricultural storm water discharge,' [40 C.F.R. § 122.23(e)] a 
category of discharges that the Act exempts from regulation .... "). 
150 1d. ("[T]he Clean Water Act's definition of 'point source' requires regulation of all CAFO 
discharges, notwithstanding the fact that agricultural stonn water discharges are otherwise deemed 
exempt from regulation."). 
151 1d. at 507 (pointing out that the Clean Water Act's definition of "point source" does not 
include agricultural stonn water discharges). 
152 Id. The court stated that it was reasonable to conclude that Congress, by excluding 
agricultural stonn water discharges from the definition of the tenn "point source," affinned the 
impropriety of imposing permit requirements when agriculture-related discharges were not a result 
of the CAFO operator's doing but was a result of weather. In addition, the Second Circuit noted that 
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exception was a pennissible interpretation of the CW A. 153 
One critic of the agricultural storm water exemption stated that this 
exemption created a potential loophole for manure discharges because 
the exemption lacked provisions for enforcement and monitoring by the 
EPA. 154 This exemption put the onus on the CAPO to develop a 
management plan for the land application of manure, litter, or washwater 
such that discharges would be minimal. ISS However, there was "no 
guarantee that a government agency would ever review [these plans).,,156 
In effect, the EPA presumed that the CAPO would develop a 
comprehensive management plan that would allow a CAPO to fall within 
the agriculture storm water discharge exemption. IS? Without adequate 
review of these plans and strict enforcement by the EPA, there is a 
potential that unauthorized discharges will occur from CAPO sites. ISS 
A similar loophole would be present with the oil and gas 
construction site permit exemption. Unlike the storm water discharge 
exemption for CAPO sites, however, the EPA did not require a 
management plan to control sediment from coming in contact with the 
known contaminants from an oil and gas construction site. 159 In addition, 
the exemption did not include monitoring or reporting requirements to 
ensure that only uncontaminated sediment was being discharged. 160 As a 
result, a presumption was created that oil and gas companies would be 
there was no legislative history that contradicts this assertion. Id. 
153 Id. at 509. 
154 Michael Steeves, The EPA's Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring the 
Integrity of Our Nation's Waters, 22 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. 1. 367, 390 (2002) (asserting 
that the CAFO rule had "inefficient reporting and monitoring requirements, and [that] the absence of 
the permitting authority in the plan development process serves to weaken the effectiveness of the 
regulations and opens the door to unregulated discharges through the agricultural storm water 
exemption"). 
155 See id. at 390-91 (referencing the preamble to the CAFO regulation that states that CAFO 
operators are "ultimately responsible for developing and implementing effective [Permit Nutrient 
Plans]"). 
156 See id. at 391. 
157 Id. (arguing that CAFO owners and operators are required to develop a plan to manage 
nutrient application on their sites in order to qualify for the exemption, and recognizing that there is 
no guarantee that such a plan would be reviewed by any government agency). 
158 Id. at 390 ("[T]he absence of the permitting authority in the plan development process 
serves to weaken the effectiveness of the regulations and opens the door to unregulated discharges 
through the agricultural storm water exemption."). 
159 See Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591, 600 (9th Cir. 2008). 
The challenged part of the exemption in 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(a)(2)(ii) states: "Discharges of sediment 
from construction activities associated with oil and gas exploration, production, processing, or 
treatment operations or transmission facilities are not subject to the provision of paragraph 
(c)(I)(iii)(C) of this section." 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c)(I)(iii)(C) provides that a permit is required 
when the discharge "[ c ]ontributes to a violation of a water quality standard." 
160 See NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 600. 
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forthcoming and seek a storm water permit if sediments at its 
construction sites came into contact with contaminants. 161 
Without strict enforcement, like providing an adequate permitting 
scheme, there would be no incentive for the oil and gas companies to 
monitor sediment discharges from their construction sites to ensure they 
are within the exemption. 162 This would open the door to unauthorized 
contaminated sediment discharges from these sites in violation of the 
CW A. 163 Because sediment is a recognized pollutant, the EPA is 
compelled to regulate it. l64 By opening the door to potential abuse by the 
oil and gas companies, the EPA would not be appropriately regulating 
pollutant discharges. This would be manifestly contrary to the EPA's 
responsibility under the CW A to prohibit discharges of pollutants 
without a permit. 165 
IV. ALTHOUGH THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION WAS CORRECT, 
THE COURT FAILED TO ADDRESS THE EPA'S ATTEMPT TO 
CARVE OUT AN EXEMPTION FOR ONLY ONE SEGMENT OF 
THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY 
Within the Chevron step two analysis, the Ninth Circuit failed to 
address the EPA's attempt to carve out an exemption for one segment of 
the construction industry that did not extend to other segments of the 
construction industry. The EPA must apply its regulations evenhandedly 
in order to pass the "arbitrary and capricious" standard.166 Treating like 
cases differently must be either authorized by Congress or supported by 
evidence. 167 The EPA previously created permit exemptions applicable 
161 Cf Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th CiT. 1992) 
(expressing doubt over whether a light industry would be forthcoming in demonstrating that its site 
was exempt and over whether the EPA would inspect the site to see if the light industrial site was 
within the permit exemption). 
162 Cj Michael Steeves, The EPA's Proposed CAFO Regulations Fall Short of Ensuring the 
Integrity of Our Nation's Waters, 22 1. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 367, 390 (2002) (stating that 
CAFO operators must develop a plan demonstrating how they will prevent waste runoff in order to 
be exempt from permit requirements, and arguing that the lack of a permitting authority to ensure 
compliance with the exemption requirements will weaken the regulation and open the door for 
discharges to go unregulated). 
163 Cj id. (arguing that discharges will go unregulated if there is no permitting scheme to 
provide some oversight by a governmental agency). 
164 NRDC 2008,526 F.3d at 607. 
165 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 131 I (a) (Westlaw 2008) (stating that pollutant discharges are prohibited 
unless such discharges are in compliance with the named sections of the CWA). 
166 See Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(holding that when an administrating agency fails to evenhandedly apply a requirement in two cases 
that are functionally indistinguishable, the agency's actions are deemed arbitrary and capricious). 
167 See, e.g., Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1304-05 (9th 
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to one group and not to others that were similar in nature without 
justification.168 The Ninth Circuit struck down this preferential treatment 
as arbitrary and capricious. 169 Despite the court's holding against 
preferential treatment in the EPA's permit exemption, the EPA created a 
permit exemption applicable only to oil and gas construction and not to 
other types of construction, such as housing developments. This action 
constitutes impermissible preferential treatment. 
A. THE EPA ACTED OUTSIDE ITS DUTIES WHEN IT FAILED TO 
APPL Y THE PERMIT EXEMPTION EVENHANDEDLY 
"The treatment of cases A and B, where the two cases are 
functionally indistinguishable, must be consistent. That is the very 
meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard.,,170 Courts have found 
that an administrating agency acts arbitrarily when it fails to apply its 
regulations evenhandedly. For example, in Independent Petroleum Ass 'n 
of America v. Babbitt, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia struck down the Department of the Interior's ("DOl") decision 
to collect royalties from settlement payments that a gas producer 
received when releasing a pipeline company from its contract. 171 
Royalties to DOl were due when gas was physically removed from the 
ground and sold.172 The court emphasized that the trigger for payment of 
royalties was when there was actual gas production. l73 The court found 
that settlement payments were analogous to take-or-pay payments with 
respect to collection of royalties. 174 Take-or-pay payments were made 
when a pipeline company failed to purchase gas and were not linked to 
physical extraction of gas. 175 Because there was no physical extraction 
of gas, the DOl did not require royalties on take-or-pay payments. 176 
Similarly, the court found no link between the physical gas extractions 
Cir. 1992). The EPA's permit exemption for light industries was not extended to the entire industry 
class. The court stated that "[ w ]ithout supportable facts, we are unable to rely on our usual 
assumption that the EPA has rationally exercised the duties delegated to it by Congress." Id. 
168 !d. 
169 1d. 
170lndep. Petroleum, 92 F.3d at 1260. 
171 Id. at 1250. 
172 See id. at 1259 (referencing Diamond Shamrock Exploration Co. v. Hodel, 853 F.2d 1159 
(5th Cir.), in which the Fifth Circuit held that no royalties were due on settlement payments or take-
or-pay payments because gas was not physically severed from the ground at the time of payment). 
173 1d. 
174 1d. at 1260. 
17S Id. at 1253. 
176 See id. ("No royalty is due on take-or-pay payments unless and until gas ... is actually 
produced and taken."). 
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and settlement payments. 177 The D.C. Circuit held that the DOl's 
decision was arbitrary and capricious because the DOl failed to 
demonstrate how settlement payments were functionally different from 
take-or-pay payments that would support royalties in conjunction with 
settlement payments. 178 
Similarly, in 1992 the Ninth Circuit rejected the EPA's attempt to 
exempt light industries from permit requirements because the EPA failed 
to support its distinction between light and heavy industries. 179 This is 
the same case in which the Ninth Circuit found that the EPA lacked an 
adequate permitting scheme to ensure a light industry was in compliance 
with the permit exemption. The EPA required permits for light industrial 
activities only if the work areas or materials were actually exposed to 
storm water. 180 The EPA assumed that because light industrial activities 
primarily occurred indoors, exposure to storm waters would be 
minimal. 181 However, the Ninth Circuit found that the EPA failed to 
support its contention that light industry facilities would have minimal 
exposure to storm water. 182 In addition, the EPA provided no supporting 
evidence for its assumptions that light industries should be treated 
differently from other industries, which were subject to permit 
requirements. 183 Without support for its contentions, the court was 
unable to conclude that the EPA was acting within its duties. 184 As a 
result, the Ninth Circuit held the EPA's actions in distinguishing light 
industrial activities from other industrial activities and providing storm 
water permitting exemptions were arbitrary and capricious. 185 
In the present case, the EPA never explained why oil and gas 
construction sites were significantly different from other types of 
construction sites in a way that would justify exempting the former, but 
not the latter, from permit requirements for sediment-only discharges. 186 
177 Id. at 1260. 
178 1d. 
179 Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA (NRDC 1992), 966 F.2d 1292, 1305 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(holding the EPA's exemption for light industries was arbitrary and capricious). 
180 1d. at 1304. 
181 1d. 
182 1d. at 1305. 
183 1d. at 1305 ("Without supportable facts, we are unable to rely on our usual assumption that 
the EPA has rationally exercised the duties delegated to it by Congress. To exempt these industries 
from the normal permitting process based on an unsubstantiated assumption about ... this group of 
facilities is arbitrary and capricious. "). 
184 Id. at 1305. 
185 1d. 
186 NRDC et a!.'s Response to Petition for Rehearing, Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA 
(NRDC 2008), 526 F.3d 591(9th CiT. 2008) (No. 06-73217), availaole at 
http://www.epa.gov/npdeslpubs/oilandgas_nrdcbrief.pdf (referring to the EPA's findings and 
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The EPA conceded that construction activity was industrial in nature and 
that it was not free to create permit exemptions for these activities. ls7 
The EPA had even gone so far as to recognize oil and gas construction 
sites as prime candidates for NPDES permit for having serious water 
quality impacts. ISS Yet despite these prior statements, the EPA remained 
silent as to why oil and gas construction sites should be treated 
differently from other types of construction sites where storm water 
discharge permits were required for sediment-only discharges. Without 
support for the distinction, the EPA had not acted within its lawful duties 
under the CW A. In addition, unless otherwise refuted by the EPA, 
sediment-only discharges from an oil and gas construction site and any 
other construction site are indistinguishable and must be regulated 
evenhandedly.ls9 
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT HAD A DUTY TO STOP THE EPA FROM 
TREATING LIKE CASES DIFFERENTLY 
The court has a judicial duty to stop agencies from arbitrarily 
treating similarly situated cases differently.19o A court must consider 
how an agency's regulation or action is applied among an entire class in 
order to determine if the agency acted arbitrarily. In doing so, the court 
must require that the agency provide support for its decision to treat like 
cases differently before the court can extend deference to the agency.191 
For example, in Distrigas of Massachusetts Corp. v. Federal Power 
Commission, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the 
Federal Power Commission's action that required Distrigas to comply 
with the Commission's reporting requirements for its liquefied natural 
gas ("LNG") transaction. 192 The court found that the Commission 
statements that sediment causes serious water quality problems). 
187 NRDC 1992,966 F.2d at 1306. 
188 NRDC 2008, 526 F.3d at 607. 
189 See Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (~.C. Cir. 1996) ("The 
treatment of cases A and B, where the two cases are functionally indistinguishable, must be 
consistent. That is the very meaning of the arbitrary and capricious standard. "). 
190 See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A)-(O) (Westlaw 2009) (outlining when the reviewing court must 
find an agency's action as unlawful, which include actions that are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse 
of discretion). 
191 See Oistrigas of Mass. Corp. v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 517 F.2d 761, 766 (Ist Cir. 1975) 
(vacating the Commission's decision to deny the petitioner'S request because the Commission 
offered no explanation as to why it approved one request and denied a similar request). 
192 See id. at 765 (referencing the Commission's prior authorization of applying section 2.68 
of the Commission's General Policies and Interpretations, which stated that the Commission would 
provide minimal oversight over the reporting requirements for emergency gas sales, to LNG 
transactions before and around the time of this case). 
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exempted similar LNG transactions from the Commission's reporting 
requirements around the same time that the Commission denied 
Distrigas's request. 193 However, the Commission offered no explanation 
as to why it approved similar requests but denied Distrigas's request to 
be exempt from reporting requirements. 194 The court stated that this 
action "resulted in inconsistent treatment of similarly situated parties to 
the detriment of [Distrigas].,,195 The First Circuit held that the 
Commission could exclude LNG transactions from reporting requirement 
exemptions so long as the Commission sets forth polices with sufficient 
clarity for the exclusion and must apply its regulations evenhandedly.196 
In NRDC v. EPA, the Ninth Circuit should have admonished the 
EPA to ensure its regulations or exemptions are applied consistently and 
evenhandedly. This is an important consideration in this case because 
this was the second time that the EPA attempted to carve out an 
exemption for one segment of an industry while not extending it to the 
rest of the industry. Because the Ninth Circuit failed to address the lack 
of evenhanded application of the exemption, the door is open for the 
EPA to take a similar action in the future. 
The EPA must consider whether its regulations are evenly applied 
among similarly situated groupS.197 With regard to the hypothetical 
example at the beginning of this Note, the local municipality would be 
expending its resources to comply with storm water permit requirements 
in order to minimize sediment from running off the site and into the 
stream. Yet the private energy company, which is also discharging 
sediment from its site, would not have to spend time and money fulfilling 
permit requirements as a result of the EPA's permit exemption for oil 
and gas construction sites. This situation does not make sense from a 
practical point of view. In addition, the permit exemption confers a 
benefit onto one party to the detriment of another. In situations like 
these, courts must require administrating agencies to apply their 
regulations evenhandedly to prevent this type of impermissible 
treatment. In the future, if the EPA opts to distinguish one group from 
193 See id. ("The Commission has construed the regulation in other instances in precisely the 
opposite manner from here. Thus it has authorized applying section 2.68 to LNG transactions in 
letter rulings issued before at about the same time, and after the contrary ruling in this case."). 
194 [d. at 766 ("But the Commission has presented no information as to how or why those 
cases differed from the instant ones. "). 
195 [d. 
196 [d. ("If with respect to future transactions the Commission wishes to exclude LNG from 
the operation of section 2,68, it may do so by promulgating a new or revised rule setting forth its 
policies with sufficient clarity to ensure evenhanded treatment."). 
197 See id. at 765 ("[An administrative agency] has a duty to define and apply its policies in a 
minimally responsible and evenhanded way."). 
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another when enacting its regulations, it must provide support for this 
action in order to meet the "arbitrary and capricious" standard. 198 
v. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit rightly struck down the EPA's permit exemption 
for oil and gas construction sites as arbitrary and capricious primarily 
because the EPA attempted to change its long-standing position that 
sediment is a pollutant that must be regulated. The permit exemption 
was also contrary to the goal of the CW A of preventing unlawful 
discharge of known pollutants. Furthermore, the EPA lacked a 
permitting scheme that would ensure compliance with the CW A. 
Although not addressed by the Ninth Circuit, another reason the 
EPA's permit exemption was arbitrary and capricious is that it carved out 
an exemption for oil and gas construction sites without support as to why 
the exemption was not extended to other construction sites. By failing to 
address this issue, the court may have left the door open for the EPA to 
attempt to create similar permit exemptions without considering if it is 
applying the exemptions evenhandedly. The court has a duty to stop an 
administrative agency from treating like cases differently. Therefore, the 
court must be deliberate in analyzing the fairness aspect of any permit 
exemptions to ensure administrating agencies, like the EPA, apply their 
regulations evenhandedly. 
*MAR y LIM 
198 See Indep. Petroleum Ass'n of Am. v. Babbitt, 92 F.3d 1248, 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
(asserting that treating like cases differently is arbitrary and capricious). 
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